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INTRODUCTION

Regional variation in Selective Service sentencing has been the
subject of much discussion,' but rarely has it been examined from
a perspective greater than subjective commentary from more than
a few unrelated judicial districts. 2 The disparity in sentences given
to defendants whose backgrounds and crimes are similiar, but who live

1. See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1970); M. FERBER
& S. LYND, THE RESISTANCE 282 (1971); W. GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR
CouNTRY: WAR RESISTERS IN PRisoN 326-27 (1970); Hearings Before the Special

Subcomm. on the Draft of the House Comm. on Armed Services, Review of the Administration and Operation of the Draft Law, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12,481, 12,495 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Draft Hearings]; Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, The Selective Service System: Its Operation, Practices, and Procedures, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
96-97 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Draft Hearings]. For a description of statistical
studies on sentencing in general, see E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING

8-20 (1961).
2. For two studies in this area, see Comment, Sentencing Selective Service Violators: A Judicial Wheel of Fortune, 5 COLUmn. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 164 (1969); Note,
Prosecutions for Selective Service Offenses: A Field Study, 22 STAN. L. REV. 356 (1970).
The former is the result of a questionnaire survey of federal judges. While some of
the judges' responses support the data in this Comment, many of their statements re-

flect the judges' need to reexamine their attitudes in the light of their actions. The latter
is a study of Selective Service sentencing in the Northern District of California. The
author notes the need for having more empirical data from other judicial districts before
arriving at any conclusion about community sentiment and judicial actions. Id. at 405
n.253. See 119 CONG. REC. 1313-16 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1973) (especially Exhibit B). Cf.
Davis & Dolbeare, Selective Service: Present Impact and Future Prospects, 1967 WIs.
L, REV. 892, 910-11 (local as opposed to national attitudes toward Selective Service
boards; sentiment generally that local board executed national policy).
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in different parts of the country, has been criticized by some authors3
and rationalized by others.4 At the center of the debate is the influence
of the sentencing judge's own attitudes and beliefs, 5 a factor which is
alien to traditional sentencing rationale, namely restraint, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation.6 Any debate over sentencing
theories remains theoretical until such theories are supported by evidence of actual sentencing practice. To give practical meaning to
theory, one must detail current sentencing practices and attempt to
relate these to theory. To the extent that the practices are not justified by any penological rationale, we must question those practices.
And to the extent that we cannot observe the application of sentencing
theory in practice, we must question its utility.
The hypothesis of the current study was that Selective Service
sentencing varied from one region to another during the Vietnam War
period, and that this variation was directly related to public opinion.
The statistical study undertaken in order to test this premise was
based on nationwide data from Selective Service cases from 1966 through
1970.7 The results, discussed below, show that such a relationship does
exist and that the two factors are causally related. While the bulk of
this Comment is devoted to presentation and explanation of the sta3. ABA

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND

REVIEW

PROJECT ON MINI-

MUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW
OF SENTENCES 29 (Approved Draft 1968); PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOcIETY 357 (1968).
4. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 29; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 23

(1967).
5. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER, 12-25 (1973)
(especially at 12, 23-25); J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 365 (1971);
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROBLEM OF SENTENCING 58 (1962);
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1972); Glueck, Toward

Improved Sentencing, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND, 410,
415, 419 (R. Newman ed. 1962); Stone, Book Review, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1352 (1973).
For Selective Service cases in particular, see A. TATUM & J. TUCHINSICY, GUIDE TO THE
DRAFT 261-62 (1969); 1970 Draft Hearings, supra note 1, at 12,507. One war resister noted in his trial for "civil disobedience" at an army base that the judge "spoke at
length about his nephew in Vietnam, found me guilty, and sentenced me to pay a fine

of $20." D. REED, FROM HARVARD TO PRISON FOR PEACE 9 (1967). Judges' concern
for the disparity problem is evident in their many sentencing institutes. See, e.g., 26
F.R.D. 231 (1959); 27 F.R.D. 293 (1960); 30 F.R.D. 401 (1961); 35 F.R.D. 381
(1964).
6. See notes 45-53, 55-56 infra.
7. Court data has been compiled by fiscal years only. Consequently, all years referred to are fiscal years unless otherwise indicated.
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tistical study, an attempt also is made to explain the results in terms
of sentencing theory, and especially the impact of community sentiment on such theory. In any case, the statistics are the necessary, empirical first step in the process of devising a comprehensible approach
to sentencing rationale. The theoretical approach is here limited to the
statistics in this study, but with the further accumulation of such
studies, broader conclusions about sentencing theory and its application in actual sentencing practice may be reached.
The Selective Service Act of 1967 prescribes sentences of zero to
five years, with the maximum penalty a $10,000 fine and five years in
prison, for such violations as failure to register for the draft and failure
to report for induction.8 Judges can award probation or they can dispense multiple penalties for multiple violations.0 The Act affords
judges great latitude, even though the maximum prison sentence is
relatively small, and consequently lends itself to disparity in sentencing practices. 10
For more specific reasons, the Selective Service area is ideally
suited to a study of sentencing disparity: First, the crime is a federal
one, both in purpose and application. The raising of a military force
is a peculiarly national endeavor which is threatened by violations of
the Selective Service Act;" geographical variation in sentencing cannot
therefore be easily explained by differing regional goals.' 2 Second, Selective Service Act defendants are a unique group since they are
younger, wealthier, and more law-abiding than the majority of persons
accused of crimes.' 3 For the most part these defendants do not fit traditional sentencing criteria. They generally have not performed acts
8.

Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SSA].

9. See United States v. Haywood, 393 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1968). The defendant received 10 years in prison and a $20,000 fine.

10. Comment, supra note 2, at 164.
11. See L. HERSHEY, LEGAL ASPECTS

OF SELECTIVE SERVICE

71 (rev. ed. 1969)

(comments on the rationale behind imposing maximum sentences); 1970 Draft Hearings

12,481 (Selective Service Director Curtis Tarr testified that the courts are a necessary
means to enforce the Selective Service system). But see W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at
276 (objecting to the use of a minority to compel military conscription).

12. One could propose that regional variations in numbers of Selective Service

defendants should be countered by variations in sentencing for general deterrence purposes. See text at notes 54-56 infra. Whether general deterrence is capable of calculation

in Selective Service Act cases is discussed by F.

ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE

93-96 (1971).
13. See W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 245-46; 1970 Draft Hearings 12,501; Solomon,
Sentences in Selective Service and Income Tax Cases, 52 F.R.D. 481, 482 (1971);
Comment, supra note 2, at 180-81.
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of violence to person or property, and thus are not dangerous. Furthermore, their recidivism rate is particularly low. 14 By conventional standards, therefore, they do not require physical restraint.' 5 Virtually
none of the criteria for imprisonment as delineated by the American
Bar Association, Model Penal Code, and Model Sentencing Act provisions'0 is relevant to their sentencing. Since there are relatively few
differences among the defendants' backgrounds or actions which might
legitimately permit a judge to individualize the sentencing decision, it
14. The violation is seldom repeated. For example, failure to register is not a continuing violation. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970). Table VIII below
compiles recidivism rates. For more information on traditional sentencing criteria as
applied to Selective Service defendants, see text and notes at notes 45-53, 55-56 infra.

TABLE VIII
R EcIDIVISm*

Fiscal
Year

Total

SSA
Total

1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

50.2
45.6
51.2
53.5
57.7
60.3
60.6
62.5

24.0
21.3
25.7
28.8
28.1
30.2
26.3
33.3

1959
1960

67.6
67.3

16.1
11.5

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

60.1
56.6
53.9
44.2
43.2
46.5
44.2

9.0
4.8
4.2
3.4
8.2
7.9
9.2

Percent with Prior Convictions
Jehovah's
Religious
Witnesses
Objectors
11.3
8.0
15.3
15.4
9.0

Other

3.1
13.0
8.0
0.0

45.2
40.1
39.4
30.1
32.0

4.2
4.2

0.0
0.0

36.4
22.2

0.0
0.0

0.0
25.0

5.8
9.6

0.0

* All statistics are from U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS, ANNUAL
REPORTS, and STATISTICAL REPORTS, issued under these various names from 1941-72,

except for 1942. Where there are no figures, the numbers were not reported that year.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). The Columbia study, however, reports almost 45 percent of its respondents thought society
must be protected from Selective Service Act violators. Comment, supra note 2, at 183.
16. ABA ADvisoRy COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 81, 107, 313-14, 330, Supp. 2-3 (Approved Draft 1968).
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necessarily follows that there there should be very little sentencing
disparity as a result of these characteristics. 17 Yet the disparity exists,
and it seems most likely that the public opinion variable can be isolated in this situation-where the defendants are homogeneous and
individualizedsentencing theory is inapplicable.
The fourth reason for selecting this subject was the public opinion
variable itself. The war years, from 1966 through 1970, were punctuated with dramatic events, significant enough to change public
opinion."' Strong popular reaction to the controversial war during the
five-year period under examination increased the possibility of measuring well-defined public opinion. This study, however, is not historically complete, since current data is not yet available for the years
following 1970, and prosecutions still continue despite the end of
conscription. Nonetheless, the concentration of court activity and the
public reaction to the war during the years for which data is available
makes this relatively circumscribed period ideal for case study.
I.

METHOD OF COMPUTER-BASED STUDY

A. lfeasurements of Public Opinion
Previous commentary has depended almost exclusively on impressionistic results or isolated computations of judicial action, as
noted above. The goal of the instant study was to compute the rela17. At least one author suggests that previous studies of sentencing disparity are
methodologically unsound. Edward Green asserts that data collectors have not employed
appropriate criteria and suggests that if they discovered the factors truly applicable to
judges' decisions (in Green's study, "inviolability of personality"), rational sentencing
standards would emerge in their correlations. E. GREEN, supra note 1, at 48-49. This
Comment does not deal with the factors suggested by Green, but it seems clear that
the data here is nonetheless valid for two reasons. First, the defendants' backgrounds
and acts are not as varied as in the studies Green criticizes, and these factors seem relatively less important than others in Selective Service cases. Second, the variables which
are compared in this study are so unrelated that any statistical relationship is significant. To the extent that characteristics such as race and type of crime may be related
because of some third factor, Green's analysis is appropriate. It suggests that we consider that third factor, such as environment, rather than the judge's sentencing policies.
That conclusion also might be appropriate in this study, but it hardly qualifies the fact
that there are correlations between public attitude and length of sentences awarded Selective Service defendants. For that relationship, we must search for a cause, and it is
apparent that it will not be found in the types of defendants or acts.
18. See Gallup, Public Opinion and the Vietnam War, in GALLUP OPINION INDEX 7 (Dec. 1967); cf. Asimow, Selective Service 1970: Introduction, 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 893, 895-96, 898 (1970) (judiciary effectuates changes in the Selective Service
System during the Vietnam War).
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tionship between judicial sentencing policy and public attitude toward
the Vietnam War by geographic region and by year. The first and
most difficult step in such a process was to find a good index of war
attitude over the multi-year period.
During the 1966-70 time span, the Gallup pollsters consistently
asked a particular question that appears to provide a reasonable
index of war disenchantment: "Was it a mistake for the United States
to enter the Vietnam War?"' 9 Both the "yes" and "no" responses
to this question were used and were compared to judicial actions,
although the "yes" answer was most consistent in its results. 20 The
Gallup Poll data was compiled by gross regions-East, Midwest, South,
and West 2 1 -for each of the five fiscal years.2 2 Because the Gallup data
could be broken down into only four gross regions, it was desirable
to find public attitude scales that were geographically more refined.
The court data was defined by judicial regions, and ideally public
opinion data could have been found to match these small geographic
regions, dividing the United States into approximately 90 sections.
The second gauge of public opinion that appeared useful were
the ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which
19. See 3 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION, 1935-71 at 1981-2278 (American Institute of Public Opinion 1972).
20. There is some problem with changes in the percent of responders having "no
opinion." Perhaps answering "yes, the war was a mistake" requires a greater commitment
to that opinion, hence the more uniform results for this question. Another inquiry, calculated but not reported here, was "Do you approve of the Administration's [Johnson's
or Nixon's] handling of the war?" It produced even more varied responses, since there
was disapproval from both ends of the spectrum-from those who wanted greater war
activity as well as from those who wanted less. Although this question, too, was asked
throughout the period and was correlated with the court data, the results were less
consistent. The fact that data is reported here only for the opinion item which most
appropriately correlates might suggest that the relationships are incidental. However, the
consistency of the correlations reveals that not to be the case and argues persuasively
for the "yes" answer as the best measure of war disenchantment.
21. States were divided into regions as follows:
East: Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, Vermont, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Kansas;
Midwest: Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri,

Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota;
South: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas,

and Oklahoma;
West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
22. When there was more than one poll taken in any particular year, the answers
were averaged only when they were spread evenly over the year. For example, if the polls
were taken in two consecutive months, then not for another six months, the two months'
data were not weighted as two separate polls in that year.
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in 1970 rated members of the House of Representatives on their foreign policy attitudes. The ADA periodically rates Congresspersons by
selecting approximately one dozen key votes for a particular session.
These votes are those which the organization considers most clearly to
represent the division between Representatives who support an issue
on its merits and those who do not. The 12 votes employed by the
ADA for its House Foreign Policy rating in 1970 were based almost
exclusively on foreign policy in Southeast Asia and on military funding.23 For purposes of this study, the votes were considered to be good
indicators of the attitudes of these Representatives toward the Vietnam War. The ADA ratings for judicial districts were compiled by
coordinating 8924 of the districts with their Congressional counterparts, matching maps and county names, and averaging the ADA rating for the Representatives in each judicial district. The 1970 judicial
district ratings then were compared with the court data for fiscal 1970
for each such district.
The obvious limitation of this gauge of public opinion is the
assumption that the ADA rating may be equated with public opinion.
First, the data is limited by the ADA in its selection of the 12 Congressional votes. Second, the ADA arrives at its rating through its own
system. It will be assumed here that the ADA rating represents the
liberalness or conservativeness of a Representative on the Vietnam War.
In addition, while we cannot assume that Representatives and the
general populace have identical views on the Vietnam War, the fact
that the ADA ratings correlated highly with Gallup "yes" answers (r-.50; Table VI B) -i.e., according to the ADA the more liberal judicial districts had more persons responding "yes, the war is a mistake"
-indicates that this assumption is at least partially valid. Given
the difficulty of finding indices of war opinion and the attractive geographical breakdown of the ADA data, its usefulness is evident despite
its inherent limitations.25
B. Measurements of Court Actions
The second step in the design of this study was to collect detailed information on judicial sentencing decisions. Two basic sources
23. ADA WORLD MAGAZINE, Sept. 1970, at 8M-11M.
24. Not all judicial districts were used. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
Virgin Islands, and Guam, for example, were not consistently reported throughout the
period, nor did they have Congressional representatives.
25. See note 35 infra.
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for court data were: the U.S. Bureau of Prisons' StatisticalReports for
1966-1972 and the Administrative Office of the United States, qourts,
Federal Offenders, 1966-1970.26 The hundreds of pages of tabular data
in these volumes are distinguished by offense and ,district inm many
cases, permitting useful comparisons. In addition, the Administrative
Office has developed its own scales of district leniency fog,sentencing
and for probation. 27 These scales are based on a district's oy~rall
sentencing pattern compared to the national norm for a particular
year, and were used to relate the district's actions in Selective Service
caseswith its behavior in all cases of that period.
Collection of the data for the five years, 1966-70, provided sufficient material to employ several variables. The major variables, described in detail on Table I, include three describing numbers of
TABLE I,,
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY

SSA defendants: total SSA defendants
SSA defendants/total: total SSA: defendants divided by total'all defendants
SSA defendants/population: total SSA defendants divided bi population'
conviction rate: convicted SSA defendants/total SSA defendants divided by all defendants convicted/total all defendants
weighted sentencing (also termed uncorrected sentencing or sentencing) : total sentence
weight all SSA defendants divided by convicted SSA defendants
Sentences weighted as follows:
probation, fine only, or other
0q
split sentence
one year & one day and under
2
one plus one to three years
3
three to five years
4.
five and over
5
corrected sentencing: total sentence weight all SSA defendants/total convicted SSA
defendants divided by 10 minus leniency of probation scale*.
probation: total SSA defendants placed on probation/total convicted SSA defendants
divided by total all defendants placed on probation/total convicted defendants
corrected probation: total SSA defendants placed on prob.tion/total convicted SSA
defendants divided by 10 minus leniency of probation scale*
The figure 10 was used inan attempt to eliminate negative numbers. Although not
completely successful, the figure does not affect the correlations and means since it was
used in all division calculations.
26. FEDERAL OFFENDERS is the title of current volumes published by the Administrative, Office of the U.S. Courts, but it also was the title used by the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons for its basic annual report through the 1950's.
27. The leniency scale (or severity scale, as it is sometimes called) is based on the
Administrative Office's own weighting system, which could not be applied directly to
Selective Service materials. The information on sentencing of Selective Service violators
was not presented in the same detail as was utilized :by that office in arriving at'its
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Selective Service defendants, one on conviction rate, two on sentencing,
and two on probation. The three variables describing the numbers of
defendants are: first, total numbers of SSA defendants (raw numbers) ;
second, the percentage of SSA defendants compared to the total number
of defendants for all offenses; third, the percentage of SSA defendants
compared to the total population of the area being examined. The
conviction rate variable compared conviction rate of SSA defendants to
the conviction rate of all offenders. The two sentencing variables are:
first, the average length of sentence in the area; second, the average
length of sentence "corrected" by the leniency factor described above.
Probation variables are first, probation rate for SSA defendants compared to probation rate for all defendants; and second, SSA probation
rate corrected by the leniency factor for probation.
II.

DEDUCTIONS FROM STATISTICAL COMPUTATIONS

A. Annual and Regional Correlations
The data in the following paragraphs depends solely on correlations of the various court variables with public opinion data.2 8 Since
the goal of this study, done with the aid of a computer, was to compare judicial actions with public attitude, the correlation is one of
the best and most sophisticated methods of comparison that could be
employed. Basically, the correlation is a measure of the association
between two sets of trends or factors. It measures quantitatively how
much the factors or trends change in relation to each other, if at all.
The preponderance of the data was compiled either annually (looking at a change from one year to another, but holding the region constant: "by region"), as in Table II, or regionally (looking at the change
from one region to another, but holding the year constant: "by year"),
as in Table III. The correlation can range in value from -1.00 to
±-1.00; the greater the number, regardless of sign, the stronger the
relationship. Positive correlations signify that the two sets of factors
are changing in the same direction (as one increases, the other increases, or vice versa) ; the negative correlations indicate that the two
weighting for the leniency scale. See Table I infra for weighting used in this study. For
an Administrative Office's severity of sentence scale, see 1966 FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Part III Appendix, Table D7. For a probation scale, see id., Table D8.

28. The word "disparity," although not used with any frequency in this section, is
essentially on point. The fact that sentences change in regions as the attitudes change
implies that there are different kinds of sentences being meted out from one region
to another or from one time period to another.
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TABLE II
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WAR DISENCHANTMENT AND COURT DATA

BY REGION (AcRoss YERis)
Court Variable

East

Midwest

South

West

Mean
Correlation

SSA violators/total
SSA violators/population
conviction rate
weighted sentencing
corrected sentencing
probation rate
corrected probation

.87
.91
-. 81
-. 40
-. 39
.86
.58

.95
.92
-. 85
.48
-. 36
-. 09
.67

.70
.90
-. 55
.46
.82
.17
.75

.91
.96
-. 78
-. 07
.00
.53
.56

.86
.92
-. 75
.12
.02
.37
.64

TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WAR DISENCHANTMENT AND COURT DATA
BY YEAR (ACRoss REGIONS)
Court Variable

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

Mean
Correlation

SSA violators/total
SSA violators/population
conviction rate
weighted sentencing
corrected sentencing
probation rate
corrected probation

-. 77
.00
-. 73
.44
-. 93
-. 94
.15

-. 91
-. 25
.87
.85
-. 80
.33
.52

-. 31
-. 77
-. 25
.10
.21
-. 40
.18

.63
-. 48
.46
.48
-. 95
.08
.44

-.
-.
-.
-.

.88
04
52
17
61
.07
1.00

-. 10
-. 31
-. 01
.34
-. 61
-. 17
.46

sets of factors are changing together but inversely (as one increases,
the other decreases). A significant correlation does not necessarily indicate causality since it is possible that the relationship between the

variables is dependent upon some third factor producing the change.2 '
Despite this caution, the correlation literally means the predictability
of one set of facts from another set of facts. 80
29. For example, there is a correlation between smoking and cancer, yet the
Tobacco Institute suggests there is a third factor related to the physical need to smoke
which is responsible for the connection. If there were such a factor, the smoking, though
correlated with cancer, could not be said to cause cancer.
30. Thus, for example, if we hypothesize that the correlation between the number
of cigarettes smoked and the frequency of cancer reported was .50, that number signifies that we could predict 25 percent (r') of the frequency of cancer solely from a
knowledge of the number of cigarettes smoked. To illustrate a correlation from the
instant study, the change in conviction rates for Selective Service defendants is correlated r=-.75 with the change in war disenchantment over time. That number reveala
that one can account for 56 percent (.75') of the decrease in conviction rates solely on
the basis of the increase in war disenchantment. In other words, conviction rates clearly
decreased as attitudes towards the war became more censorious.
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It should be noted that although the correlation coefficient (r)
is a statisticalmeasure of relationship, the concept of statistical significance is not appropriate in the present context because the correlations ,are parameters of the entire population of relevant cases rather
than statistics from a sample of cases. In other words, the data includes
every Selective Service case decided in the years under consideration 31
-it is not a sampling of such cases. Thus, the values of the correlations can be taken to indicate the exact degree of relationship between
the variables under consideration; even a zero (0) correlation is
significant since it reveals an exact relationship.
There are no other figures between the raw data (means in
Tables IV and V) and the correlation figures in Tables II and III:
these figures represent the statistics the computer arrived at by comparing first one region to a second, then the second region to a third, etc.
(or 1966 to 1967, then 1967 to 1968, etc.). The result is a statement
of how much the two factors (for example Gallup Poll "yes" answers
and convictiofi rate) changed together. The data in Table II indicates
how the variables changed together over time. In other words, the
computer examined the changes from one year to another within one
region at a time (hence the terms "by region" and "across years").
The mean correlation merely states the average of the four regions.
Similarly, Table III data shows how the variables change together
from one region to another within one year at a time (hence the terms
"by. year" and "across regions") ; again, the mean correlation simply
states the average of the five years.
1. Numbers of Defendants. The first two variables in each table
.deal with the number of defendants in court in each region and year.
The annual correlations (showing how the public opinion and number
of defendants changed together by region, over all the years) show
that the number of defendants increased almost exactly as the percentage of persons expressing war disenchantment increased. Statistically,
these figures demonstrated a high correlation between the number of
SSA defendants in each region (both as a percent of total defendants,
=.86, and as a percent of the region's population, r=.92). (See Table
II.) This relationship might logically be expected: as antiwar sentiment
-grew, so did the number of persons who were charged with SSA violalations. Concomitantly, as antiwar sentiment lessened, so did the number of SSA defendants.
31. See note 24 supra.
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The data elicits a different result when we examine regional variations. A reverse trend appeared (r=-.10, percent of total; r==-.31
by population) (see Table III), demonstrating that where there was
high war disenchantment there were fewer defendants, and where
there was low war disenchantment, there were more defendants. This
regional result indicates that the high, positive relationships with defendants over time (discussed in the previous paragraph) were ap-,.
parently the result of the simultaneous increase or decrease in both of
these factors (number of defendants and public attitude), not the
result of their being directly related. One disclaimer should be noted,
however. These figures, encompassing as they do the number of SSA
defendants who were in court, are tied to local enforcement policy,
rather than to judicial actions. Hence they may represent the results
of prosecutorial rather than public or judicial attitudes.3 2 The data
dealing more directly with judicial action (especially sentencing and
probation) is more indicative of judicial policy.
To summarize: Defendant numbers varied with war disenchantment over time but not regionally. Thus it cannot be assumed that
the number of defendants wag directly related to war attitude (increasing as disenchantment increased; decreasing as it decreased). Rather,
both number of defendants and war disenchantment appeared to be
related to a third variable, perhaps prosecutorial policy and manpower
needs during the Vietnam War. A further study might compare the
data of this study with induction rates in an attempt to solve this
problem.
2. Conviction Rate. As war disenchantment became greater in a
region over time, conviction rates went down. This is shown by the
average annual correlations within each region: a heavily negative
relationship existed between war disenchantment and conviction rate
(r==-.75). But when war disenchantment varied from one region to
another, there was no meaningful change in conviction rate. That
is, when the correlations were computed regionally (within years),
the changes in war disenchantment between regions did not produce
variations in conviction rates (r-.01).
Conviction rate, therefore,
was changing with war disenchantment over time, but the two factors-conviction rate and war disenchantment-were not necessarily
directly related.
The conviction rate variable is defined as the percent of SSA de32. See note 48 infra.
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fendants convicted, compared to the percent of total offenders convicted. Since these percentages are computed by dividing the raw
number of SSA defendants convicted into the total number of SSA
defendants (see Table I), the figures are tied to factors not related to
judicial or jury activity. The suggestion can again be made that the
added variable of enforcement policy may be operating here, or that
the change in the status of the war and the resultant manpower needs
83
affected conviction rate over time.
33. From 1940 to the present, one can view trends in convictions and sentences as
they follow the nation's participation in war. See Table IX infra. Of particular interest
in the data is the fact that the sentences following the Korean War decrease much less
than do the sentences following World War I.

TABLE IX
SENTENCING OF SELECTIVE SERVICE VIOLATORS,

1943

TO PRESENT

Total Convicted

Average Sentence
(months)

1943*

3,930*

33.4*

1944*
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972*

3,124*
2,838
1,652
1,137
304
292
175
156
313
345
424
289
186
262
229
202
166
199
225
265
206
242
371
748
784
900
1,027
1,036
304*

30.6*
31.9
20.6
14.3
14.1
14.6
13.4
29.6
30.5
29.3
26.4
24.8
24.0
23.7
21.6
23.2
21.5
22.6
21.6
21.5
20.8
21.0
26.4
32.1
37.3
36.3
33.3
29.1
30.9*

Fiscal Year

Total Defendants

4,287
2,651
2,074
833
506
449
368
561
630
822
719
371
357
325
258
239
244
274
338
276
341
516
996
1,192
1,744
2,833
2,973

* These figures are from Bureau of Prisons statistics and reflect defendants received
from the U.S. courts into federal prisons. The percentage of persons received into fed-
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3. Sentence Length. The sentencing variables produced significant relationships over time (within regions), although the results were
more complex than those previously discussed. When war disenchantment increased annually, sentence length appeared to be little affected
(weighted, r=.12; corrected, r=.02). It should be noted here, however, that the South was primarily responsible for the positive correlation (weighted, r=.46; corrected, r=-.82). The Southern figures mean
that as war disenchantment increased, sentence length also increased.
In other regions (with one exception), as war disenchantment increased, sentence length decreased. The Southern result perhaps can
be explained by the fact that Southern war disenchantment has been
flavored by a conservative military position. 34 As one might expect, the
eral prisons was lower than those sentenced, especially in 1972. The average time served
eliminates those given fines, for example, and those sentenced to less severe institutions
and therefore for less time. Consequently the average months figure is no doubt higher
than it would be for total defendants sentenced, although the average months was identical for 1945. The 1945-71 figures are from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Disposition of Defendants Charged with Violations of Selection Service Acts, Showing
Type of Sentence for Fiscal Years 1945 through 1971, in 1970 FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS,

Table H10, at 166. The figures for 1943, 1944, and

1972 are from U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 1943 & 1944 FERAL
BUREAU OF PRISONS,

1972

STATISTICAL REPORT

OFFENDERS,

and U.S.

Table 13-2, at 68-69. No report was

issued for fiscal year 1942 because of the war, and no offenders were listed in the report
for 1941.
34. Both Gallup and Harris opinion polls demonstrate that the South and West
harbor conservative war opinions. It is not, therefore, always appropriate to cite the
South as the most conservative region on war policy, but there are numerous polls
which do confirm that contention. Gallup conducted an interview in which the respondents were asked if they considered themselves "doves" or "hawks." In two such polls,
the South revealed the strongest hawk position (43 percent, May 1, 1968; 38 percent,
Nov. 13, 1969) and a weak dove position (one percentage point higher than the West
in each poll: 38 percent, May 1, 1968; 50 percent, Nov. 13, 1969). 3 TEE GALLUP POLL,
supra note 19, at 2223. The South was also least favorable to removal of all U.S. troops
from Vietnam, as compared with the retention of a residual force (45 percent favored
taking out all the troops, compared to the next closest region, 60 percent, Midwest,
July 19, 1971). Id. at 2317. The South was the region least favorable to bringing all the
troops home "before the end of next year" in a Sept. 27, 1970 poll (38 percent), although it was not the most opposed to this plan (38 percent, second to the West at 44
percent). Id. at 2267. In response to a question in which the interviewees commented
on four Vietnam plans, ranging from immediate withdrawal to the commitment of additional troops, the South registered the lowest percentage of persons favoring the more
liberal actions (43 percent total, May 15, 1970; 36 percent total, Jan. 11, 1970), and
in one poll was the region most favorable to the more conservative plans (45 percent total
to West's 48 percent total, May 15, 1970; 55 percent total compared to West's 50 percent total, Jan. 11, 1970). Id. at 2233, 2241-42. The Harris polls reveal strikingly similar results. For example, the South gave the greatest support for resumption of fullscale bombing of North Vietnam in May 1970 (63 percent; the West was next highest
at 61 percent). The South also had the least opposition to this plan (25 percent). TIE
HARRIS SURVEY YEARBOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION,

1970, at 113 (Louis Harris & Assoc.,
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East maintained its liberal 35 tradition, handing down lighter sentences
as disenchantment grew (r=-.40; corrected r=-.39).
All the conclusions in the previous paragraph included both
weighted sentencing, which refers to average sentence length, and
corrected sentencing, which divides average sentence length by a
leniency factor. Corrected sentencing demonstrates a region's (or
year's) sentencing practices in SSA cases compared to its practices in
sentencing all offenders. Because corrected sentencing takes into account what a region does normally, it can be considered a more accurate
reflection of the region's approach to Selective Service cases. When we
examine the figures for sentencing regionally (within years), the results for weighted sentencing and corrected sentencing are not as close as
they were above. Regionally, as war disenchantment became stronger,
sentences became heavier for weighted sentencing (r=.34). But as war
disenchantment became stronger, corrected sentencing became lighter

(r=-.61). This apparent discrepancy between the correlation for
weighted sentencing and the one for corrected sentencing demonstrates that as war disenchantment increased from one region to another, sentences increased in length, but they actually decreased in
comparison to the norm for those regions. One explanation for this
apparently peculiar result is that Selective Service defendants were
indeed treated very differently from other offenders. The data suggests that in regions in which judges normally sentenced harshly, Selective Service defendants were treated temperately, whereas in regions
where judges normally sentenced lightly, Selective Service defendants
received lengthy terms.
It is my contention that the most important result from these regional calculations is that produced by the corrected sentencing
variable. Since that variable shows how SSA defendants were senInc. 1971). The South found the most justification for the invasion of Cambodia in
1970 (67 percent), and contained the smallest minority responding that there was no
justification (16 percent). Id.
35. "Liberal" and "conservative" as used here refer solely to war attitudes. "Liberals," according to ADA criteria, supported withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia,
reductions in military funding, and replacement of the draft with a lottery system. Conservatives favored maintenance of troops at a higher level than did liberals, increased
military funding both for Southeast Asian actions and for defense weaponry, and continuation of the draft system as constituted in 1969. For the criteria used by the ADA
in compiling their ratings in 1970, see ADA WORLD MAGAZINE, Sept. 1970, at 8M. The
Senate criteria add to the definition. Id. at 1IM-12M. Although "liberal" and "conservative" could be applied to judicial activity, roughly corresponding to lenient and harsh
conviction and sentencing practices, the terms are not used in that sense here.
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tenced compared to what normally occurs in the region or district, it demonstrates more conscious treatment of SSA defendants as
a coherent and distinct group. The correlation produced (r=-.61)
asserts conclusively that as disenchantment grew, SSA defendants received sentences that were lighter than usual for that area; whereas
as disenchantment lessened (or in regions where it was not great),
SSA defendants received sentences that were heavier than usual for
that area.
4. ProbationRate. Both of the variables that deal with probation
again demonstrate a relationship between a trend toward leniency and
a trend toward greater war disenchantment. Annually, the percentage
of Selective Service violators awarded probation compared to awards
to all defendants rose as war disenchantment increased (r=.37). The
same relationship, although stronger, existed when "corrected" probation rates were used (r=.64). Evidently, therefore, the frequency with
which probation was awarded to SSA violators was even more distinctly related to war disenchantment when the region's overall probation pattern (accounted for by the use of the leniency scale) was
considered.
The regional statistics are less strong. Regionally, as war disenchantment increased from one region to another within any one year,
the probation rate decreased. This is demonstrated by the slightly
negative relationship in the correlation figure (r-=-.17). It should
be noted that the regional figures in Table III reveal an inconsistent
pattern for this variable. Again, however, the major contention that
judicial actions were directly related to war attitude is confirmed
by the corrected probation figure. As war disenchantment grew from
one region to another, the region with higher disenchantment was
more likely to award probation than was its custom. This result is
similar to that described above for sentencing. The correlation coefficient with corrected probation (r-.46) shows this relatively strong,
positive relationship for the regional correlation. Again, we can assert
that the corrected variable, in this instance probation, was more indicative of attitudes toward Selective Service cases than was the mere
comparison of probation percentages.
5. Summary of the Correlations. The conclusion to be drawn
from these several variables is that there was a meaningful relationship between judicial action and public sentiment toward the war.
Even though some of the results, such as conviction rate, indicate
481
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that the relationships were not necessarily directly related (existing
together only over time), others indicate true regional differences.
Particularly important for the hypothesis that judicial action and
public attitude varied by region are the regional correlations (Table
III). Regionally, the figures revealed that as war disenchantment increased, corrected sentencing decreased and corrected probation increased. These results confirm expectations of lighter sentencing practices where there was greater animosity toward the war and harsher
sentencing practices where there was less opposition. Regionally, the
number of defendants decreased where war disenchantment was
greater, contrary to what one might expect and contrary to the situation over time. Most of the statistics are surprisingly meaningful, because of the difficulty of finding relationships between attitude and
behavior, especially the attitude of a large group and the behavior
36
of a small subgroup of judges.
The relationships that are not consistent with the expected pattern of lenient/disenchanted and harshness/less-disenchanted must not
be ignored, however. Several suggestions have been offered for the
findings that conviction rate did not vary regionally with war attitude;
for example, prosecutorial policy, change in status in the war, and
manpower needs. But complete answers await further studies in this
sentencing area.
B. Means
1. Regional Means. If we examine the averages for these variables regionally for all five years, the conclusion must again be drawn
that regional public attitude and judicial actions were interrelated.
36. The size of the correlations is made possible in part because of the fact that
only four pairs of data points go into the By Year (across region) correlations, because
there are only four regions. Similarly, only five pairs of data points go into the By
Region (across year) correlations, because there are only five years involved. In general,
it is easier to achieve such sizable correlations with few data points. The small number
of points available is unfortunate, but as a result of that fact each data point involved
is very reliable and stable, since it is based on many cases. By contrast, the correlations
from the ADA ratings of Congresspersons are much smaller, because they are based
on many more data points (89, since there are 89 districts used in the study). The data
provides interesting additional input, but it must be remembered that the ratings of a
few Congressional votes, while they may be a good index of those individuals' positions
on the war, are a very indirect and unchanging indicator of antiwar sentiment among
the population generally. Hence such relationships will tend to be lower in magnitude
and will provide a less direct answer to the questions posed here. See text at notes 23-25
supra.
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The bar graphs in Table IV vividly demonstrate the area variations in
judicial actions. The mean ADA ratings were compiled, and they
follow the typical labels regarding liberal and conservative regions.
The South was archly conservative on the war (6.7 ADA average score
per district), while the East was the most liberal (45.3), with the

TABLE IV
REGIONAL MEANS

ADA rating/district

SSA defendants/year
Southt
Midwest
West

45.3

East

343
s

324
e510

282

SSA defendants/total

SSA defendants/population

Conviction rate, SSA/total

Weighted sentencing average

Midwes i

Midwes I
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TABLE IV-Continued
"Corrected" sentencing
South

.33

Midwest

South

-. 05 1

Midwest[

West
East

Percent probation, SSA/total

.86

54
64

West

-.44

East

79
65

"Corrected" probation
South N 5
Midwest
West
Eastl

66
M17
70

West (29.3) and the Midwest (19.9) falling in between these extremes. Correspondingly, the South contained the fewest defendants per
district (9.5), the fewest SSA defendants compared to total criminal
offenders (3.6 percent) and the fewest SSA defendants by population
(44). These figures indicate that the South had a greater number of
criminal defendants for all offenses than the other regions. On the
other hand, the South had the highest conviction rate for SSA defendants (73 percent), the highest weighted sentencing average (2.6),
relatively high corrected sentencing (.3), and the lowest probation
figures, both by rate (54 percent) and after correction (5).
The East produced a relatively high ratio of SSA defendants by
district (17.6), by percent of total offenders (7.6), and by population
(86). Yet the graphs reveal that it had the lowest conviction rate (58
percent), a low sentencing average (1.8; lowest when corrected at
-. 4), and a proportionate share of probation (65 percent raw; 70 percent highest, corrected). The West, with the largest number of defendants by population at 142 (30.0 per district; 6.4 percent of total),
fell in the middle ranges on conviction rate (69 percent). It had the
lowest sentencing average (1.6) but the highest corrected sentencing
484
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rate (.9). The West awarded probation at the highest rate (79 percent), although this trend was reversed when compared with its leniency rating (17, second lowest). These figures indicate that the West
awarded relatively lenient Selective Service sentences, but also gave
relatively lenient sentences to offenders generally. Again, while these
regional means were not perfectly consistent, the overlapping of the
several variables supports the argument that sentencing and regional
attitude were directly related.
2. Annual Means. The annual means similarly reveal a surprisingly
consistent graphical pattern when viewed in graphic form. (See Table

TABLE V
ANNUAL MEANS

Percent "yes" (war a inistake)

50

1

63

34.3

5 .

55

1969

19'70

25-27.3

1966

1967

1968

Defendants/district

30

11

15 -

1969

I

2.1

19.7

13.4

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970
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TABLE V-Continued
Percent SSA defendants/total

10-

/ /

.9
3/

4 .3

2.0
0

JI

1966

1968

1970

Conviction rate, SSAltotal

80-

476

7

60
45
40 1v

1967

1968

1969

1970

Weighted sentencingaverage/convicted

41
2.2.58

2.53
1.88

1.54

0I
1966

1

1968

1969

1970
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TABLE V-Continued
Percent probation,SSA/total

75 73

50.
34

1967

1966

1968

1969

1970

1968

1969

1970

"Corrected" sentencing

2

-21

1967

1966

"Corrected" probation
117

1009
50'

13

20
2

1968

1969

O
.I
-1966

4
1967

1970
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V.) As the Vietnam War continued and disenchantment grew, the
number, as well as percentage, of defendants increased, the conviction
rate decreased, sentencing became lighter, and probation (both percentage and corrected) increased (the latter three with the exception
of 1967). Corrected sentencing3 7 was less consistent, rising twice and
never dropping below the 1966 level. Weighted sentencing also never
fell below its 1966 mark. In 1970 defendants reached their greatest
numbers while the conviction rate was at its nadir. Additionally, in
1970 the percentage of Selective Service defendants on probation
reached its zenith for the entire period, and, with the exception of
1966, weighted sentencing was at its lowest.
The 1969-70 period reflected a slight levelling in war disenchantment, but produced marked changes in the other variables. After years
of steady increase, this 1970 levelling of war disenchantment indicates
the possibility of delayed judicial reactions to public opinion. This conclusion can be drawn only with time-lag studies. Without such correlations, one can do no more than suggest the possibility.
C. ADA Correlations
The results of comparisons based on 1970 ADA ratings of 89 judicial districts were less emphatic than those based on the broader regional comparisons, despite the fact that ADA ratings and Gallup Poll
measures were fairly highly correlated (r=.50). (See Table VI; the last
factor in the A matrix encompasses the data in this paragraph.)
The relationship between a high number of defendants and liberal
ADA ratings was extremely strong, even when compared to the total
number of defendants in the district (r=.27) and then corrected for
population (r=.42). Hence, the more liberal districts had fewer
defendants in general, but they had more Selective Service defendants.
In direction, the conviction rate, sentencing, and probation correlations indicate consistency with the Gallup results, but the correlations
-with the exception of sentencing-are smaller, as expected (r=-. 12
conviction rate; r=-.30 weighted sentencing; r=:.07 corrected sentencing; r=.10 probation, both percentage and corrected). Unlike
the Gallup results, the ADA figures reveal that sentence length lessened
as liberalness increased, yet there was no correlation after the sentenc37. For a definition of the corrected variables, see text at note 27 supra.
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TABLE VI
CORRELATIONS AMONG CouRr DATA VARIABLES

A. Matrix: Correlations Using ADA Computations

asa
0

Cd0

=

-

.

-"

.4

0
0

conviction rate
weighted sentencing
corrected sentencing

0

.27
.04

.02

probation rate

-. 05

-. 72

-. 03

corrected probation
ADA rating (1970 only)

-. 09
-. 12

-. 15
-. 30

-. 02
-. 07

B. Matrix: Correlations Using Gallup Computations
conviction rate
weighted sentencing
.40
corrected sentencing
.11
.05
probation rate
-. 58 -. 75 -. 04
corrected probation
-. 62 -. 24 -. 12
Gallup "yes"
-. 68
.12 -. 08

k

0

.17
.10

.10

.42

.27

.42

ADA
Rating

.43
.36

.52

.50

ing was corrected. Problems of correlating the ADA data, discussed
above, may be responsible for these differences in correlations.38
38. Correlations also were tabulated for the relationships among the court variables themselves. While these figures are not directly applicable to the hypothesis of this
Comment, they raise interesting questions that may be evaluated in the future. Table VI
discloses these relationships, indicating which judicial activities were consistent with each
other. For example, corrected and uncorrected sentencing were not related to each other
(r=.02 ADA; .05 Gallup). Nor did corrected and uncorrected probation always correlate (r=.17 ADA; r=.43 Gallup). But as one would expect, as the sentencing penalties
imposed became less severe, the probation rate increased: probation correlated inversely
with weighted sentencing (r=-.72 ADA; r=-.75 Gallup). Since probation statistics
were an integral part of the weighting of sentencing, this relationship was anticipated
to some extent. In the ADA matrix, the conviction rate failed to correlate with any
of the variables, except weighted sentencing (r=.27). As expected when one views districts where conviction rates increased, sentences likewise increased. The Gallup Poll
matrix, unlike the ADA matrix, displays relatively high correlations between three of
the four sentencing variables and the conviction rate. It should also be noted here that
the terms ADA and Gallup are used only as designations to indicate two different forms
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D. Individual District Means
The averages of individual districts illustrate more vividly the
facts already demonstrated by the correlations, bar graphs, and time
lines. Two of the four California districts, Northern and Southern,
exemplify districts frequently cited in discussion of widespread draft
evasion and related court leniency. 39 Both districts have unusually large
numbers of draft defendants. The Northern District of California,
for example, had 48.9 draft cases per 10,000 population compared to
the country's average of 14.1 in 1970; the Southern District was close
behind with 43.1. Over the years the districts have been almost equivalent in the ratio of defendants to population (Northern, 9.5; Southern, 9.4), surpassed only by Oregon (11.7), whose judges are also recognized as lenient.40 Draft defendants were 14 percent of the total
cases in the Northern District, lower than only three other districts in
the country (including Oregon, 17 percent) .41
of identical court data and not data related to or collected by ADA or Gallup. The
difference between the two matrices is the quantity of data points included. In the
ADA matrix there are 89 districts multiplied by one year or 89 data points involved
in each correlation (many points give good representation on regional differences
although each point is less stable); and in the Gallup matrix there are four regions
multiplied by five years or 20 data points in each correlation (these average together
many districts, giving far poorer representation of regional differences, but providing
more stable data points). See discussion at note 36 supra.
39. Selective Service Director Curtis Tarr said "abuse of the law is more common
in a few areas of the Nation than we can tolerate, and the most crucial region is northern
California. We believe this is true because violators there have not been convicted in
sufficient numbers." 1970 Draft Hearings, supra note 1, at 12,481. A law clerk for a
federal district judge in northern California stated in a speech to high school students,
reprinted in the hearings, that most defendants in northern California did not go to
jail. Id. at 12,495. A California newspaper article referred to the "legal logjam" created
by draft defendants in San Francisco courts. Id. at 12,502-05. The hearings also incorporated a National Observer article referring to the lighter sentences and higher acquittal
rate in San Francisco. Id. at 12,506. Hershey in 1969 criticized draft counselors and
courts in that area. 1969 Draft Hearings 96-97. Ferber and Lynd referred to the high
draft refusal in California, especially at the Oakland induction center. M. FERBER &
S. LYND, supra note 1, at 283. Draft counselor Tatum cited California and Oregon
courts for their lenient sentences. HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIE aOUS OBJECTORS 71 (A.
Tatum ed. 1970).
40. See W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 326-27; Solomon, supra note 13, at 487 (Solomon was then the chief judge of the Oregon District Court). Only four other districts
had defendant per population ratios over eight.
41. The three other districts were the Western District of Michigan, 16 percent;
the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 17 percent; and Oregon, 17 percent. In 14 districts,
Selective Service cases were more than ten percent of the total defendants, including
the Southern District of California.
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Average sentence lengths are another indicator of judicial policy.
The California districts were both high in number of defendants but
differed significantly in their average sentence lengths (Northern 1.1,
corrected -3.4; Southern 2.2, corrected -0.2).
The Northern District was among the lowest in the country in sentencing. 42 The disparity
can be viewed across the country: Eleven districts revealed average
sentences over the entire period of greater than 3.5 (3=one to three
years in prison; 4--three to five years in prison). These districts are
predominantly in the South (all except one district each in Illinois
and Missouri) ; Texas and Oklahoma are each represented by two districts. This concentration confirms reports of judicial harshness in the
43
South, especially in the latter two districts.
III.

THEORETICAL APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS

The fact that a relationship existed between judicial action and
public opinion does not in itself ascribe any cause and effect to that
relationship. It is possible that judicial actions affected public attitudes, or conversely that public opinion affected judicial actions.44
Although from this data one cannot conclusively choose the latter
alternative, that assumption seems irresistible when considering sentencing theory. The data has established the existence of a relationship; the question it poses is how and by what rational sentencing
policy that connection can be explained.
A. Selective Service Defendants and TraditionalTheories
Selective Service defendants do not fit easily into traditional sentencing theories. The principle of restraint requires a defendant's imprisonment because of the danger that he will commit additional
crimes.4 i Rehabilitation is based on the assumption that his values
42. Only eight districts had lower weighted sentencing averages, although 36 fell
below 2.0.
43. See, e.g., W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 326-27; A. TATUMi & J. TUcnINSKY,
supra note 5, at 262.
44. It is also conceivable that a third variable, for example the war or the press,
was causing sentences and attitudes to vary regionally without implying a relationship between the two. It is difficult to comprehend that this factor alone could cause
the regional variations that existed between the two classes of factors (attitude and
court data) without there being a direct relationship between those two.
45. See ABA PROJECT, supranote 16.
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need to be altered in order for him to be integrated into society.40 The
aim of individual deterrence is to inhibit the offender from committing
the same act again. 47 Yet these competing theories must be accommodated and applied to the individual. If Selective Service defendants differed substantially in background or type of crime, which they do not,
and if these factors were congregated in various regions, then these
sentencing rationales might possibly explain regional variations. Even
then it would be exceedingly difficult to account for the existing correlations between regional sentencing and public attitude.48 The only
theories that can adequately account for the results of this study are
general deterrence, which utilizes the chastized defendant to deter
other potential defendants from violating the law, 49 and general retribution, which incorporates the concept of societal condemnation of
the wrongdoer.50
Even if the data in this study can be accounted for only by a
sentencing theory, as will be demonstrated, any interpretation would
stem from a series of assumptions which the data cannot verify. It is
possible, as noted above, that other causal relationships are affecting
the correlations. It is also conceivable that the judges do not consciously
respond to public opinion, but are acting as members of their communities whose value systems they have unwittingly internalized. This
data reveals a need for judges who deny that they are influenced by
community opinion 5l to rethink their position. If the judges' actions
46. Rehabilitation repeatedly is dismissed as a factor in Selective Service sentencing.
See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 445 F.2d 808, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1971); W. GAYLN,
supra note 1, at 26, 136; cf. Campbell, Developing Systematic Sentencing Procedures,
FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1954, at 3.
47. See note 15 supra.
48. One explanation for some of the disparity in Selective Service Act sentencing
could be variation in prosecutorial practice. There are some indications of tegional
variations in policy among the federal prosecutors. See M. FERBER &: S. LYND, supra
note 1, at 282; W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 322-23; Note, supra note 2, at 40, 322;
1969 Draft Hearings 549 n.1; 4 SSLR 70 (1971); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Jan. 15, 1973, at 26-27. However, the statistical record reproduced here, both by year
and by region, conclusively demonstrates that prosecutorial policy cannot explain away
the multitude and magnitude of regional correlations. Nonetheless it is possible that
prosecutorial policy has some effect on the annual correlations, especially the variables
relating to defendant numbers (including conviction rate).
49. General deterrence is the most frequently used rationale for Selective Service
sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 337 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D. Minn. 1972);
Campbell, supra note 46, at 6; Solomon, supra note 13, at 486; Comment, supra note
2, at 184; materials cited note 11 supra.
50. Text at notes 55-62 infra.
51. Comment, supra note 2, at 186-87.
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fit within the framework of penologically sound sentencing rationale
and yet the judges were acting unconsciously, their sentences would
be outside the realm of legitimate sentencing rationale. 52 This must
necessarily follow, as sentencing theory presupposes that judges act
consciously or at least are cognizant of such influences.
1. General Deterrence.The general deterrence theory would help
to interpret the results only if it could be established that different
areas of the country had varying proportions of draft evaders and
therefore required disparate sentences to deter other potential evaders.
Thus areas with high war disenchantment would require lengthier
sentences and less probation in order to dissuade others.58 Yet the
study decisively disputed this conclusion. In fact, areas of intense
war disenchantment dispensed shorter sentences than were usual for
those areas. The correlation that demonstrated the number of Selective Service defendants increased where war disenchantment was least
might be supportive of the deterrence theory. But the other suggestions for this result, particularly prosecutorial policy, do not in fact
lend much weight to the deterrence theory. Moreover, the fact that
conviction rate did not vary with public attitude again seems to defeat
the deterrence proposition.
But the data might support the deterrence rationale upon an
examination of the correlations between numbers of defendants and
judicial actions, irrespective of public attitude. The results from the
ADA computations (by district for 1970) and from the Gallup statistics (by region multiplied by year) were extremely dissimilar.54 Table
VII contrasts the matrices for both ADA and Gallup data. The ADA
matrix indicates that there were negligible correlations between the
numbers of defendants in court and judicial actions in a district.
The one exception was the correlation between the conviction rate
of Selective Service defendants compared to total defendants (r=
-. 21). The Gallup data, on the other hand, demonstrates strong
correlations with all sentencing activities except for corrected sentenc52. Frankel emphasizes the need for logical connections between sentencing rationale
and sentencing action. M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 103-24 (especially at 109-10);
Frankel, supra note 5, at 9-10.
53. This is the implication behind Hershey's claim for maximum sentences (see
L. HERSuEY, supra note 11, at 71) and his criticism of the court's role in enforcement
(Note, supra note 2, at 413 n.251), as well as in Tarr's criticism of the courts' actions
(1970 Draft Hearings 12,481).
54. See discussion at note 36 supra.
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TABLE VII
CORRELATIONS AMONG COURT DATA VARIABLES
FOR NUMBERS OF DEFENDANTS
A. Matrix: Correlations Using ADA Computations (1970 only)
conviction weighted corrected probation
rate
rate
sentencing sentencing

corrected
probation

SSA defendants

-. 05

-. 02

-. 03

.08

.11

SSA defendants/total
SSA defendants/population

-. 21
-. 07

-. 03
-. 03

-. 00
-. 04

.10
.09

.14
.12

B. Matrix: Correlations Using Gallup Computations (Region X Year)
SSA defendants

-. 59

-. 39

.02

.63

.45

SSA defendants/total
SSA defendants/population

-. 82
-. 58

-. 24
-. 27

-. 09
.03

.58
.55

.76
.44

ing. For all three measures of the number of defendants, where there
were more defendants, conviction rates decreased, sentencing became
lighter, and probation became more frequent. Thus we must conclude

either that defendants were deterred in districts where there were
heavier penalties, or that districts with the most defendants awarded
more lenient sentences. While the data, without time-lag correlations,
cannot demonstrate deterrence per se, it indicates that there was a
direct relationship between the number of defendants and judicial actions-at least by gross regions. If there were a deterrence theory in
operation here, it would nevertheless fail to explain the regional
sentencing variations that were related to attitude. In addition, the
study shows that there is no correlation between high numbers of
defendants and war disenchantment. However, it is possible that the
enforcement policies in the various regions have obscured the judicial
impact on defendant numbers, as previously discussed.
2. Community Sentiment. If general deterrence cannot account for
the disparity this study has revealed, retribution remains as the sole
legitimate sentencing rationale. Pure retribution has been commonly
denounced as an archaic theory of sentencing 5 Yet a retribution
hybrid, the community sentiment concept, is accepted by many theo55. See, e.g., R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 219 (1970); S. RUBIN, CasIar AND
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 30 (1961); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 140 (1956).
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rists. These penologists maintain that judges should incorporate the
feelings of the community into their sentencing policy. The rationale,
which is drawn from many different theories, has been stated variously
in terms religious ("atonement") and sociological (reinforcement of
society's values) .5"Selective Service cases neatly fit this framework since
the breach of this particular law is generally purposeful, 57 and hence
could be viewed as more of a threat to society than less willful crimes. 58
To some persons, however, the act is morally purposeful and just.59
The community sentiment concept is an attempt to promote
social good. Presumably, sentences which do not comport with community expectations foster illegal community revenge, or, at the least,
a lack of respect for the law. Concomitantly, sentences which reinforce
the community norms promote social solidarity.60 Since the data in
this study demonstrates regional variations in judicial actions based
56. For descriptions of the concept that society has a need to "demand atonement"
or exhibit "public disapproval," see F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE
JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 223 (rev. 1962); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 59 (1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 23; Cooper, A Sentencing Problem: How Far Is a

Fall from Grace? 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 587 (1966).
57. Only willful violators are prosecuted. See, e.g., SELECTIVE SERVICE, ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW 3 (Special Monograph No. 14, 1951); DIRECTOR
OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, SEMIANNUAL REP. 13 (Jan. 1-June 30, 1972).
58. This conception of sentencing sometimes is stated as society's need to close its
circle around the wrongdoer, or as individuals' needs for "living out... their own aggressive hostile impulses." Jones, Punishment and Social Values, in CRIMIINOLOGY IN TRANSITION, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMANN MANNHEIM (T. Grygier, H. Jones & J. Spencer
eds. 1965); see F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, supra note 56, at 232, 223-26. Selective
Service violators appear heinous to some segments of society. The district judge in Daniels
was quoted as saying the law the defendant violated "strikes at the very foundation and
fundamentals . . . of our whole governmental system." United States v. Daniels, 446
F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1971). The appellate court found the judge's five-year sentence
had no penological rationale behind it. Id. at 972. A judge in another case found it
sufficient to say, "[W]e can't fool around with people like that. We are in a War and
a man who is a citizen of this country ought to act as such and with that you can prepare the proper order." As the appellate court reported, the district court judge gave
the defendant ten years in prison and a $20,000 fine for two violations. Haywood v.
United States, 393 F.2d 780, 781 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd and remanded, 411 F.2d 555
(1969).
59. Several authors discuss the Selective Service violator as one who commits a crime
of conscience. See, e.g., Woosley v. United States, 440 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); W. GAYLIN, supra note 1, at 275, 8; SELECTIVE SERVICE,
supranote 57, at 80.
60. For the most explicit discussion of the usefulness of punishment in maintaining society's solidarity, see E. DURHEIm, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 88-89,

93-107, 108-09 (Simpson transl. 1933). The theory is, however, directed at increasing
penalties rather than decreasing them.
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on public attitude, one could hypothesize that sentences in different
parts of the country truly incorporated the differing community sentiments. As public disenchantment with the war became greater, the
sentences imposed were lighter; and, as public disenchantment lessened,
sentences became heavier. These results confirm the theory that judges
should award lighter sentences where the community exhibits less
disapproval of the offender (i.e., where war disenchantment is higher) 01
and heavier sentences where the community exhibits more disapproval
(i.e., where war disenchantment is lower). The theory is particularly
helpful in accounting for the correlations with corrected sentencing
and probation figures. It is these results which most reflect the
sentencing of Selective Service defendants in terms of the community
norm, and which therefore demonstrate the applicability of the community sentiment concept.
If judges are in fact reacting to community opinion, the question still remains whether their application of this opinion through
sentencing is penologically sound. Can judges actually translate war
sentiments into concepts based on community attitudes concerning violations of the law? If a judge could make this translation, could he
then individualize sentences by interpreting what sentence the community thought was appropriate for each violator? This transference,
although it involves several steps, is essentially one of transmitting
war sentiment-which the judge must glean through an analysis of
the public sentiment-to a sentence for an individual violator. In between these two poles lies the public's norm for violators of any of its
laws.
If we can continue to make all the assumptions asserted above,
namely that there is a cause and effect relationship between public
attitude and judicial actions, and that the judges are applying and
can apply the concept of community sentiment, we still must deal with
the issue of whether the norm should be operating at this point in the
61. In United States v. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F. Supp. 1292 (D.P.R. 1970), the
district judge, after sentencing the defendant to one year, brought the case back on his
own motion and reduced the sentence to one hour. The one-year sentence for the defendant, who believed the draft act unconstitutional as applied to Puerto Rico, apparently triggered student riots. judge Cancio said if he had "written that law, I would
have considered [Edwin Feliciano-Grafals] a conscientious objector such as to exempt
[him] from compulsory military service." Id. at 1298. Here the community's response,
which the judge also internalized in his own value structure, apparently caused the
judge to change his sentence.
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criminal process. 6 2 Assuming the judge utilizes a public attitude scale
as an indicator of the community's norm for punishment, should he
be performing this function? Or, must the community norm be expressed solely as a legislative duty, through the establishment of maximum and minimum penalties.
Whether the community sentiment concept should be applied to
a federal crime may also be considered independent of sentencing
policy. Violations of the Selective Service law affect only national goals
pursuant to military manpower needs. Therefore, are local community
standards appropriate considerations? If the "community" were defined as the entire nation, then regional variations in the data are not
the relevant community sentiment. On the other hand, public opinion
on a national scale may be meaningless when applied to individual
draft defendants, whose sentences are visible only to their local community. The dichotomy noted here is between national laws and decentralized enforcement. A national policy of sentencing would not
serve any of the purposes of the community sentiment concept. In
fact, it would heighten adverse community reaction to what certain
localities might consider to be inappropriate sentences. On the other
hand, regional sentencing for a federal crime produces its own disrespect for the law, by comparisons of disparate sentences given to defendants who appear in all other respects to be identical. In other
words, regional sentences foster social discontent by negating individuation and the theories of rehabilitation that underlie it, and by
frustrating the goal of uniformity.
3. Applicability of Sentencing Theory in Practice. In addition to
the problems of conscious sentencing decisions discussed above, this
data sheds light on another area of sentencing theory. If it is true that
it is retribution that is at work in sentencing decisions in Selective
Service cases, should it be the sole policy that is operating? Why should
the dictates of the other theories be ignored? And what, if any, weight
should each theory have? The difficulties of answering these questions even in light of definitive statements about sentencing practices and elaborately constructed theories again suggest the impracticality of sentencing theory, or, as one author has labeled it, the
63
"lawlessness" of sentencing.
62. Cooper, supra note 56, at 587, 595. Cooper strongly objects to the use of
community sentiment after the legislative act.
63. Frankel, supra note 5, at 7.
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B. Conclusions
The scope of this Comment was limited to Selective Service cases
and to a time when public opinion had become highly articulated.
The limitations purposefully employed allowed for isolation of several
variables, including relevant public opinion and applicable sentencing
theory. The conclusion that there was a relationship between attitude
and sentencing, therefore, can be stated only in terms of these specific
defendants and judicial activity from 1966 through 1970. Nonetheless,
the results of this study have wide-ranging implications which may be
observable in future studies. It is highly likely that similar relationships exist between other attitudes and sentences for other crimes.
Model studies of other politicized areas, such as civil rights violations,
sex offenses, and drug abuse, might reinforce the conclusions reached
here. In the future, studies may be conducted in areas where politicization is less of a factor, but where public opinion is still critical, such
as in crimes of violence or white collar offenses. The results of such
model studies, with the inclusion of time-lag correlations, should
enable us to attain a better understanding of the interrelationship between judge and community.
DIANNE BENNETr GRAEBNER

